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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(l)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE 1. Does Mr. Kearl's failure to cite and argue applicable standards 
of review in his brief preclude appellate review? 
Preservation: This issue arose in Mr. KearPs bridf on appeal. 
Standard of review: The requirement that an appellant identify the applicable 
standard of review for each issue with supporting authority is set forth in Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 24(A)(5). Briefing of an issue is inadequate when the overall analysis 
of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing 
court. State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, \ 13, 72 P.3d 138. 
ISSUE 2. Has Mr. Kearl shown that the trial court abused its discretion by 
declining to ask plaintiffs voir dire questions regarding alcohol use? 
Preservation: This issue has not been preserved for appeal. Although Mr. 
Kearl submitted a list of proposed questions, including questiopis regarding alcohol use (R. 
565-567), he has not provided, a transcript of the argument regarding voir dire, and there is 
no other indication in the record that he argued a legal basis for the questions and, if so, 
upon what stated grounds. Accordingly, Mr. Kearl cannot demonstrate that he raised his 
present argument in the court below. See O'Dea v. Olea, 20^9 UT 46, ffli 15, 18-19, — 
P.3d -— ("To properly preserve an issue at the district court, the following must take 
place: *(\) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically 
raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.'"). 
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Standard of review: Challenges to a trial court's management of jury voir 
dire are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App 152, % 13, 71 
P.3d601. 
ISSUE 3. Has Mr. Kearl shown an abuse of its discretion by the trial court 
denying his motion for a new trial based upon alleged juror misconduct? 
3.A, Were ail or portions of the affidavits of Kay Armstrong and Mr. 
Kearl's counsel inadmissible or otherwise improper for consideration in 
Mr. KearPs motion for new trial? 
Preservation: This issue was preserved in the parties' briefing regarding 
appellee Okelberry's motion to strike the affidavits (R. 827-837, 866-872.) 
Standard of review: Whether the affidavits were inadmissible is a question of 
law reviewed de novo. Brown v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 168, fflj 19-20, 136 P.3d 1252. 
3.B. Has Mr, Keari shown an abuse of discretion in any event? 
Preservation: This issue was addressed in connection with Mr. Kearl's 
motion for new trial (R. 802-806, 810-820, 838-855). However, Mr. Kearl has not provided 
a transcript of the trial testimony that he claims would have triggered or implicated the 
juror's alleged bias. Consequently, this issue has not been preserved on appeal. 
Standard of review: The denial of a motion for new trial is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exck, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). Because the 
trial court did not address the elements of the McDonough test that governs alleged voir 
dire misconduct, both prongs of the test are reviewable by this Court as a matter of law. 
State v. Redding, 2007 UT App 350,1f 17 n.4, 172 P.3d 319. 
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ISSUE 4. Has Mr. Kearl shown an abuse of discretion by the trial court in 
denying a motion for new trial based upon alleged attorney misconduct 
involving exhibit 38? 
Preservation: This issue was partially preserved. Mr. Kearl objected on the 
grounds of timeliness, but did not object on the grounds that the questions violated the 
privacy of third persons until after the examination had concluded. (R. 948, pp. 7-8.) 
Standard of review: This issue is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Hales v. 
Oldroyd, 2000 UT App 75, ffll 15-16, 999 P.2d 588 ("Trial courts have broad discretion in 
determining discovery sanctions because trial courts must deal first hand with the parties 
and the discovery process"; abuse must be "clearly" shown); G. M. Leasing Co. v. Murray 
First Thrift & Loan Co., 534 P.2d 1244, 1245 (Utah 1975) (court has discretion with regard 
to alleged violation of court order); Vanderpool v. B. K. Hargis, 23 Utah 2d 210, 461 P.2d 
56 (court has discretion in control of counsel and the trial). 
In addition to abuse of discretion, the appellant ijiust demonstrate, "from the 
totality of the evidence," that the alleged misconduct was "substantial and prejudicial such 
that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more 
favorable result." State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750,755 (Utah App. 1996). 
ISSUE 5- Has Mr. Kearl shown an abuse of discretion by the trial court in 
denying his motion in limine to limit the testimony of the defendant's expert, 
and in precluding him from informing the jury that the expert was paid by a 
liability insurance company? 
Preservation: These issues were raised in the trial court through Mr. Kearl's 
pre-trial motions in limine (R. 229-287). However, they h^ve not been preserved for 
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purposes of appeal, because Mr. Kearl has not provided a sufficient record to permit review. 
See p. 38, infra. 
Standard of review: The trial court has "considerable" discretion in deciding 
whether to admit or exclude expert testimony, including whether adequate foundation has 
been laid and limitations on cross examination. State ex rel G. Y. v. State, 962 P.2d 78, 83 
(Utah App. 1998); State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1982); Shurtleffv. Jay Tuft 
and Co., 622 P.2d 1168, 1173 (Utah 1980); Clayton v. Ford Motor Co., 2009 UT App 154, 
f 24, — P.3d — ; State v. Tucker, 2004 UT App 217, t 12, 96 P.3d 368; Paulos v. 
Covenant Transport, Inc., 2004 UT App 35, J^ 20, 86 P.3d 752. A trial court's decision to 
admit or exclude evidence under U.R.E. 403 is "toward the broad end of the spectrum" of 
discretion. State v. Lindgren, 910 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Utah App. 1996). 
In addition to an abuse of discretion, the appellant must demonstrate that the 
alleged error was substantial and prejudicial to the extent that, without the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a different outcome. Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 610 (Utah 
1974); U.R.E. 103 ("Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected"). 
ISSUE 6. Has Mr, Kearl shown an abuse of discretion by the trial court in 
declining to instruct the jury regarding alcohol use as a pre-existing condition? 
Preservation: Mr. Kearl took exceptions (R. 948, pp. 27-28) to the trial 
court's decision not to give instruction nos. 18 and 24 (R. 584, 578). However, he has not 
preserved the issue on appeal, because he has not provided a trial transcript, and has not 
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pointed to evidence introduced at trial that would have supported the giving of such an 
instruction. See Orem City v. Longoria, 2008 UT App 168, \ 6 dnd n.l, 186 P.3d 958. 
Standard of review: A trial court's ruling concerning a jury instruction is 
reviewed for correctness. Paulos v. Covenant Transport, Inc., 2004 UT App 35, j^ 10, 86 
P.3d 752. However, an appellant has a duty to show that "there [was] competent evidence 
to support" the instruction. Id., ffif 11, 27; State v. Low, 2008 U t 58, ffij 25, 27, 29, 192 P.3d 
867. The appellant must also show that the failure was prejudicial, i.e., that "there is a 
reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, there would have been a result more favorable 
to the complaining party." Jenkins v. Jenkins, 2008 UT App 454 *2 (unpublished), citing 
Tingey v. Christensen, 1999 UT 68, % 16,987 P.2d 588. 
Issue 7. Did the trial judge abuse his discretion or otherwise err in not 
recusing himself? 
Preservation: Mr. Kearl did not preserve this is$ue in the court below. He 
participated in the proceedings for several months, including filing a motion for new trial, 
after being on notice of the alleged grounds for disqualification. Additionally, although Mr. 
Kearl filed a motion for disqualification in the trial court (R| 880-888), he withdrew it 
before any court action was due. (R. 925-928.) 
Standard of review: The standard of review for this issue is unclear, and is 
addressed infra, pp. 43-45. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
U.RXiv.P. 63(b)(1): 
(A) A party to any action or the party's attorney may file a motion to 
disqualify a judge. The motion shall be accompanied by a certificate that the 
motion is filed in good faith and shall be supported by an affidavit stating 
facts sufficient to show bias, prejudice or conflict of interest. 
(B) The motion shall be filed after commencement of the action, but not 
later than 20 days after the last of the following. 
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(E)(1): 
A judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to 
instances where: 
E.(l)(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party 
or a party's lawyer, a strong personal bias involving an issue in a case, or 
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
Plaintiff Robert Kearl filed a negligence suit against defendant Edwin Okelberry 
on May 20, 2005, alleging that on September 8, 2001, while Mr. Kearl was helping Mr. 
Okelberry move a trailer, the trailer fell on him. (R. 2-3.) From November 5-9, 2007, the 
case was tried to a jury, which found that Mr. Okelberry was not negligent. (R. 786-788.) 
Accordingly, the jury did not reach the issue of damages. Id. 
The trial court's judgment on the jury verdict was entered December 3, 2007. (R. 
799-801.) On December 10, 2007, Mr. Kearl filed a motion for a new trial, and for 
sanctions against Mr. Okelberry's attorney for alleged misconduct relating to the handling 
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of a trial exhibit. (R. 802-803.) Mr. Kearl's motion was accompanied by affidavits of 
one of the jurors and of Mr. Kearl's counsel purporting to convey statements by one of 
the jurors. (R. 804-820.) Mr. Okelberry opposed the motion for new trial, and moved to 
strike all or portions of the affidavits. (R. 827-855.) 
The post-trial motions were heard February 20, 2008. (See R. 949.) At the 
conclusion of the February 20 hearing, Judge Stott stated an intent to deny the motion for 
new trial. (R. 949, pp. 13-18.) Two days later, Mr. Kearl filed a motion to disqualify 
Judge Stott, claiming that the judge had engaged in improper ex parte contact with Mr. 
Okelberry's counsel three months earlier. (R. 880-888.) Before any court action was due, 
Mr. Kearl acknowledged that his motion was untimely, and withdrew it. (R. 925-928.) In 
his "Withdrawal of Motion to Enter Disqualification," Mr. Kearl's counsel suggested that 
the judge disqualify himself sua sponte. (R. 925-928.) 
On March 12, 2008, the trial court denied Mr. Kearl's motion for new trial.1 The 
court did not rule on Mr. Okelberry's motion to strike the affidavits submitted by Mr. 
Kearl. (R. 925-935.) Mr. Kearl timely appealed on March 28, 2008. (R. 939-940.) 
Statement of facts 
Except for a few isolated portions, there is no trial transcript, and Mr. Kearl's 
statement of facts is supported by citations to pretrial filings and memoranda. 
Accordingly, Appellee Okelberry has done the same, except as otherwise noted. 
1
 The court signed alternative orders submitted by both parties. (R. 929-935.) 
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Facts relating to plaintiff's proposed voir dire regarding alcohol use 
Prior to trial, Mr. Kearl submitted proposed voir dire consisting of 65 questions. 
(R. 563-577). Three proposed questions related to alcohol use: 
63. Do you drink alcohol? Yes No 
64. Does any member of your family drink alcohol? Yes No 
65. Would you have a hard time being impartial toward a party if they 
drink alcohol? Yes No If "yes," please explain: 
(R. 566.) 
Mr. Kearl contends that the trial court erred by not giving these instructions. (The 
record does not contain a final version of the court's voir dire questions, and Mr. Kearl 
did not order a transcript of the voir dire, except for follow-up questioning of juror W. 
Gary Harward (R. 948, pp. 3-4). Accordingly, the record does not reflect which of the 
parties' proposed questions were or were not asked.) 
Facts relating to alleged juror misconduct 
The first morning of trial, Monday, November 5, 2007, each member of the jury 
pool was given a Prospective Jury Questionnaire to complete. Prospective jurors filled 
out the questionnaire before entering the courtroom, and prior to introduction of the 
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parties and attorneys. At that time, they had no information about the case, other than that 
it involved "an accident." (Question 12.)2 
After completion of the questionnaires, and appropriate time for counsel to review 
the completed forms, the jury pool was brought into the courtroom and the court 
conducted its own, additional voir dire. Counsel were thereafter afforded an opportunity 
to request individual questioning, in Chambers, of any prospective juror from whom they 
wanted additional information. (R. 853-854.) At the deferidant's request, prospective 
juror W. Gary Harward was called into chambers and asked some follow-up questions. 
(R. 948, pp. 3-4.) The court asked Mr. Kearl's counsel if h0 had any questions of Mr. 
Harward, and he said no. (Id., p. 4.) 
Question 8 on the jury questionnaire asked: "Do yoii believe you have a valid 
reason that would make it difficult for you to serve as a juror? If necessary, the Judge can 
discuss this with you privately." Mr. Harward answered, "No." Question 10 asked: "If 
you were in the position of either party, would you feel comfortable with yourself as a 
juror? If not, please explain." Mr. Harward answered, "Yes." (R. 819, 853.) 
After hearing the evidence, the jury returned a verdict that the defendant, Mr. 
Okelberry, was not negligent. Because the jury found no liability, it did not reach the 
The questionnaires themselves did not end up in the trial court's record; however, their 
pertinent content and Mr. Harward's responses were undisputed in briefing below. (R. 
819.) Question 12 asked, "Have you ever been injured in an accident?" From that, jurors 
might reasonably infer that the case involved an accident of some sort. (R. 854-855.) 
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question of damages. (R. 786-788.) Polling confirmed that the verdict was agreed upon 
by six of the eight jurors. (R. 789.) 
In conjunction with his motion for a new trial, Mr. Kearl submitted an affidavit of 
Kay Armstrong, Juror No. 17 and the jury foreperson at trial. (R. 810-813, 853.) (Ms. 
Armstrong was one of two jurors who, when polled, said that she did not agree with the 
verdict.) (R. 789, 853.) 
Ms. Armstrong's affidavit purported to summarize isolated comments or actions of 
Mr. Harward during deliberations. (R. 810-813, 853.) Ms. Armstrong also claimed that 
she "saw prejudice" on the part of other unnamed jurors. (R. 813, 853-854.)3 
Mr. Kearl also submitted an affidavit of his counsel, Denton M. Hatch (R. 804-
806), recounting a brief telephone conversation in which Mr. Harward declined to discuss 
the trial with him, but said he felt he had "help" in making his decision. (R. 827-836.) 
Facts relating to alleged attorney misconduct regarding Exhibit 38 
On the third day of trial, defendant's counsel, Ruth Shapiro, questioned one of Mr. 
KearFs damages witnesses, Dr. Ron France. (R. 768-769, 948, pp. 5-10.) Intending to 
elicit information that Dr. France's recommendations were essentially the same for all 
3
 Ms. Armstrong's accusation of impropriety by her fellow jurors seemed somewhat 
ironic. It was undisputed below that, during one break in the trial, Ms. Armstrong 
ignored the court's repeated instruction not to speak to the parties, and told Ms. Shapiro's 
paralegal to tell Ms. Shapiro that she should wear a blue suit the next day. Upon learning 
of the contact, Ms. Shapiro notified the court. Ms. Armstrong was brought into 
chambers, where she admitted her misconduct and was admonished. (R. 766.) 
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plaintiffs, Ms. Shapiro's questioning included the use of an exhibit, described more 
particularly below. The Court found the content of the exhibit to be proper, but that the 
way the exhibit was presented was not. (R. 948, p. 17.) The partial transcript reflects the 
following sequence of events: 
a) As Ms. Shapiro began the questioning, she marked an exhibit (which 
had an accompanying blowup) as Exhibit 38. (R. 948, p. 5.) 
b) The exhibit contained three sections. At the top, counsel summarized 
the treatment regimen that Dr. France recommended foif Mr. Kearl. Below that 
information, counsel summarized the recommendations made by Dr. France for litigants 
in two other cases. For purposes of cross-examination, counsel had covered the lower 
two summaries with sheets of paper, so that she could walk the expert through the 
recommendations one at a time. (R. 948, p. 19.) 
c) As counsel began this line of questioning, Mr. Hatch objected that he 
had not previously seen the exhibit. Ms. Shapiro showed the exhibit to the court, stating, 
*Tt's a rebuttal exhibit, your Honor." She then added, "There's information underneath 
that will serve as (inaudible)." (R. 948, pp. 5. 7, 14; also id,, p.12 (Mr. Hatch 
acknowledging that Ms. Shapiro said there was "something uftder this paper").) Because 
the bottom portions were covered, their content was not visible. The court overruled Mr. 
KearPs timeliness objection. (R. 948, pp. 16-19.) 
d) Ms. Shapiro then stated again that there was additional information 
below the summary of Mr. Kearl's treatment recommendation: 'Tn all fairness, your 
11 
Honor, there is more information underneath that I'm going to get into." (R. 948, p. 5.) 
However, to counsel's regret, and for which she later apologized, she did not clarify to the 
court what the additional information was Specifically, counsel did not explain that the 
additional information related to recommendations made for two litigants other than Mr. 
Kearl. When that became apparent, the court understandably became concerned. The 
exhibit was turned toward the witness, and could not be seen by the court. Consequently, 
as the questioning unfolded, the court had no way of knowing whether counsel was about 
to reveal inappropriate information about non-parties. (R. 948, pp. 16-18.) 
e) Ultimately, the court determined that the covered portion of the exhibit 
did not contain inappropriate information as it feared. (R. 948, pp. 17-18.) 
f) As the cross-examination moved to the second example, plaintiffs 
counsel again objected on the basis that the exhibit had not been timely disclosed. (R. 
948, pp. 7-8.) The court overruled the objection, stating, "It's proper cross-examination, 
rebuttal of the witness' testimony and in comparison with respect to what he's done with -
- with regard to similar situations and treatment recommendations." (R. 948, p. 8.) Mr. 
Kearl did not object to the exhibit's content. (R. 948, pp. 5-10.) 
g) The exhibit used only the initials of the third parties, and Ms. Shapiro 
instructed the witness not to disclose any names. (R. 861; R. 948, pp. 6-7, 13, 14, 18.) 
h) It was undisputed that the entire line of questioning, including Mr. 
Hatch's objections, lasted 4 minutes and 20 seconds. (R. 849, citing trial disk 13/18, 
5:23-9:43). Mr. Kearl's counsel had an opportunity to redirect. 
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i) The next day, before the jury was brought in, Mr. Kearl's counsel 
brought up Exhibit 38. At this time, he first disclosed publicly the name of one of the 
other two litigants, Karen Green, also a client of his. (R. 94$, p. 12.) Counsel asked for 
an order withdrawing the exhibit and instructing the jury to ignore the exhibit and that it 
should not have been presented to them. (R. 948, pp. 13-14)4 
j) In response, the court initially observed, "I think it's fair to say that there 
have been on both sides untimely disclosure and exchanges of information in this case." 
However, the court said it felt deceived by defense counsel's failure to disclose that there 
was additional information below the top portion of the exhibit. (R. 948, pp. 16-17.)5 
k) After extensive argument (R. 948, pp. 12-24, 28-30), the court made two 
rulings. First, it found that the line of questioning itself, an i^ the information about Dr. 
France's recommendations for other litigants, was proper cross examination fodder: 
As to the information that was discussed, that information is appropriate. Expert 
witnesses can be confronted about their prior participation, about the — about 
testimony and recommendations they made in the case that's before the court and 
4
 Mr. Kearl's counsel told Ms. Green that Ms. Shapiro had presented her "full name to the 
jury and everyone in the Court room." (R. 807-809, % 5.) Mr. Kearl now concedes that is 
not true. 
As noted above, before using the exhibit, counsel did indicate that additional 
information was contained beneath the top portion. However, counsel's meaning might 
not have been clear, or the court might not have heard counsel. During a subsequent 
discussion, the court said it did not recall counsel indicating that there was more 
information beneath the top portion. "Now, that's been a few days ago; you may be right. 
But my recollection was that this exhibit is being used for rbbuttal purposes, and there 
was never a reference of any nature of any kind going to a bottom portion of information 
on that document." (R. 948, p. 19.) 
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how it's exactly the same as it's been in other situations with other people; 
fortunately, one of the — one of the things that I was really nervous about, real 
nervous, since I couldn't see what it was, it was on the easel in front of the jury, its 
back was to me, was whether it had any names on it or not. There was no - there 
was no way for Mr. Hatch to know what was on it. I had absolutely no idea what 
was going to happen with it until it happened. Fortunately, it didn't have names on 
it, so it didn't show persons, it didn't show identification information in any 
fashion. I looked at that — 
Hatch: It did show initials. 
Court: I -
Hatch: It did show the plan. 
Court: It did show the plan, and that's the kind of information that counsel 
opposing an expert witness like this is entitled to talk about, but I — you can take 
an expert witness and you can go down deposition after deposition that he's given, 
you can use trial transcripts with an expert witness and say, Isn't it a fact that in the 
trial of such-and-such, you testified this way with respect to a plan for care? And 
you can go right down the line. You can, where information has been received, 
ask expert witnesses - or ask questions of expert witnesses to show that the expert 
witness in the case in chief, testifies the same way every single time. I've seen it, 
I've done it, I've seen other lawyers do it, both before I hit this posture of the 
courtroom and when I was sitting in your chairs. 
(R. 948, pp. 17-18.) Mr. Kearl's counsel agreed. (R. 948, p. 20 ( "I agree with the Court 
that an expert can be crossed in that manner.").) 
1) Although the court found the content and questioning proper, it found the 
manner of presentation of the exhibit improper. (R. 948, p. 18 ("It's acceptable, but it 
wasn't acceptable in the way in which it was done in this case.").) Accordingly, the court 
granted Mr. Kearl's motion, stating: "The exhibit won't go to the jury. The information 
will remain." (R. 791; 847; 948, p. 18.) "[R]ather than make any more of an issue of it 
with the jury than has already been made," the court prohibited counsel from making any 
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further reference to the exhibit at trial. (R. 948, p. 21.) The court denied Mr. Kearl's 
request to inform the jury that the exhibit had been improperly presented, concluding that 
to do so would just "accentuate the concern" to the jury. The court pointed out that it was 
not excluding the exhibit because the information was inappropriate, but only because the 
handling of it was inappropriate. (R. 948, pp. 22-23.) 
m) Mr. Kearl's counsel told the trial court ihat he did not believe the 
exhibit was persuasive, stating: "I don't think she made that great of a point, because 
pain is treated similarly no matter where it is in the body." The court replied, "If she 
didn't make that great of a point, then you don't need to worry about it." (R. 948, p. 22.) 
n) In accordance with the court's ruling, counsel made no further mention 
of the exhibit, or of Dr. France's recommendations for other litigants. (R. 846.) 
Facts relating to defendant ys expert witness Dr. Craig Smith 
David M. Ingebretsen was an expert employed by Mr. Kearl to explain the cause of 
the accident. On May 24, 2006, Mr. Ingebretsen inspected {he subject trailer and jack, 
taking "photographs, measurements, and video," and examining the outward appearance 
of the jack as detailed in his account of its operation and functionality. (R. 311-312, 314.) 
During his examination of the jack's release handle, ]Jvlr. Kearl's expert reported 
"some grease in the spiral groove and no apparent rust to any Significant degree on the pin 
or other components of the locking mechanism." (R. 312.) Thereafter, Mr. Ingebretsen 
reenacted the accident by actuating the jack handle from a safe distance using a long 
metal rod. Id. Mr. Ingebretsen did not report damage of any kind to the jack in his first 
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report, nor any evidence of "malfunction in the jack." Mr. Ingebretsen concluded that it 
was "unlikely [Plaintiff] released the jack causing his own injuries." (R. 311.) 
Three and one half months later, the trailer and jack was inspected by Dr. Craig C. 
Smith, an expert hired on behalf of appellee Okelberry. (R. 307-309.) In response to Mr. 
Ingebretsen's first report, and in light of the claims by both Mr. Kearl and Mr. Okelberry 
that they did not touch the jack at the time of the accident, Dr. Smith "undertook to 
determine if the jack might have simply dropped on its own." (R. 308.) 
Dr. Smith examined the jack to "determine the reliability of the pin latch, and how 
easily the mechanism allows for the pins to be partially engaged such that it would release 
if the trailer were bumped or caused to move." (R. 308.) His report contained a number 
of observations relating to the design of the jack. Id. 
Like Mr. Ingebretsen, Dr. Smith attempted to recreate the accident. He tested the 
jack with the pins only partially engaged and reported that "the jack held the trailer for 
about 5-10 minutes before dropping it when [he] began turning the jack handle to raise 
the gear mechanism." (R. 308.) He concluded that it was "clearly possible that the pins 
can be partially inserted by the spring mechanism, allowing the jack to hold the load of 
the trailer for some period of time, and then allowing the trailer to drop when the trailer is 
bumped or disturbed." (R. 307.) Dr. Smith concluded that "the most likely scenario is 
that the pins were not fully engaged when the trailer was unhitched and placed in the 
building earlier." Id. 
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Six months later, Mr. Ingebretsen again inspected the ttailer, reporting that the jack 
had incurred damage between his first and second inspections and that, upon a second 
look at his photographs, it appeared that the jack had been damaged at the time of his first 
inspection. (R. 302-305.) Because the jack had been damaged when he looked at it 
earlier, Mr. Ingebretsen opined that it was also "damaged to Some intermediate degree at 
the time of Dr. Smith's inspection," and therefore, "any conclusions Dr. Smith drew from 
his experiments which assumed the jack was working in the kame manner as at the time 
of the subject accident are invalid." (R. 304.) 
Mr. Kearl filed a motion in limine asking the trial coiirt to limit the testimony of 
Dr. Smith on the grounds that (1) when Dr. Smith inspected the jack, it was not in the 
same condition as the day of the accident; and (2) Dr. Smith w&s not qualified to testify as 
to what Mr. Kearl characterized as "biomechanics" issues. (R. 282-283.) After the 
motion in limine deadline, Mr. Kearl filed a second motion seeking leave to inform the 
jury that the defendant's liability insurer, Colorado Casualty, Hiad "hired" Dr. Smith. (R. 
396-400.) Defendant Okelberry opposed both motions. (R. 32^-339; 424-430.) 
According to Mr. Kearl, no recording is available of the pretrial conference on 
October 24, 2007, at which the trial court addressed the motions. Mr. Kearl did not avail 
himself of the procedure provided in U.R.A.P. 11(g), under v^hich, when a transcript is 
unavailable, "the appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from 
the best available means, including recollection." The court's rttinute entry states: 
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Two motions in limine are addressed: the motion in limine regarding Dr. Craig 
Smith, and the motion in limine regarding Colorado Casualty. Mr. Hatch and Ms. 
Shapiro present their arguments. 
The Court indicates that counsel will be subject to the rule compliance. The 
experts may testify in accordance with those guidelines. Plaintiff may not bring in 
Colorado Casualty. 
(R. 554-555.) 
Facts relating to alleged judicial misconduct 
The jury began its deliberations at approximately 5 p.m. on Friday, November 9, 
2007. (R. 789, 920-924.) The deliberations lasted more than five hours. (R. 853, 918-
919,924.) 
As the evening wore on, Judge Stott would occasionally visit the courtroom to 
update both parties on the progress or activities of the jury. For example, the judge, or his 
clerk, informed the parties that the jury had ordered dinner and was deliberating through 
their evening meal. During these updates, Judge Stott chatted informally with both 
counsel, discussing past experiences as a judge and in private practice. (R. 918, 923.) 
As the hour approached 9:30-10:00 pm, Judge Stott again ventured into the 
courtroom to provide an update on deliberations. During this visit, Mr. Okelberry's 
counsel, her paralegal, the defendant, and the defendant's wife were in the courtroom; 
Mr. Kearl and his counsel were not there or in the adjacent hallway (as defendant's 
counsel had looked into the hallway to see if they were nearby). (R. 918, 923.) 
Judge Stott and counsel exchanged pleasantries, including conversation about the 
late hour of the evening, the amount of time the jury was taking to deliberate, and the fact 
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that the jury chose to stay late on a Friday night to return a verdict instead of adjourning 
and returning on Monday. To the best of defense counsel's recollection, the brief 
conversation may have included a discussion of counsel's and Judge Stott's schedules the 
next week, in the event the jury decided to break for the ni^ht and resume deliberations 
the following Monday morning. (R. 917, 922-923.) 
In the interest of receiving feedback from a respected Judge, defense counsel asked 
Judge Stott if he had any constructive criticism of her presentation and/or performance 
during trial. Judge Stott stated that he typically did not like to give feedback to counsel, 
but that he felt that defense counsel's closing argument was \|vell reasoned and presented. 
(R. 917, 922.) Reclining on a back bench, Mr. Trevor Wenze^, the 15-year-old son of Mr. 
Kearl's fiancee, heard the exchange. In an affidavit, Mr. Wetzel said, "At that time Judge 
Stott walked over to defense counsel's table and complimented defense counsel on her 
work in the case and said that he thought she had a strong finish. The Judge then said, 
'Good luck."' (R. 892.) 
After this brief interaction (less than three minutes), Ju^ge Stott left the courtroom. 
At no point did counsel or Judge Stott discuss the merits of tlie pending case, substantive 
issues, rulings, evidentiary matters, or jury inclinations. (R. 91J7, 922.) 
Judge Stott next entered the courtroom to inform the parties that the jury had a 
question regarding the verdict form. Defense counsel again \^ent to look for Mr. Kearl's 
counsel who, this time, was present in the hallway. Thereafter, the jury's question was 
resolved in accordance with consensus from counsel and the cc^urt. (R. 917, 922.) 
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The next time that Judge Stott addressed counsel was approximately 20-30 minutes 
later when the jury reached its verdict. (R. 916, 922.) After the jury was dismissed, Judge 
Stott complimented both counsel on their performance, presentation, and advocacy. (R. 
789,882-884,916,922.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Kearl blames everyone but himself for his loss at trial, claiming 
misconduct by jurors, opposing counsel, and even the trial court. On appeal, Mr. Kearl 
has failed to identify or argue the applicable standard of review for most or all of his 
complaints. Instead, his statement of issues claims that each issue is reviewed de novo, 
even when Utah law is clearly to the contrary. This failure to comply with U.R.A.P. 
24(a)(5) with regard to such a critical issue on appeal renders his briefing inadequate. 
Mr. Kearl has failed to demonstrate a basis for finding an abuse of discretion or 
other error by the trial court in any event. The court's claimed failure to question 
prospective jurors about their alcohol use and views on alcohol was within its discretion, 
particularly when there is nothing in the record indicating that Mr. Kearl provided 
authority or analysis in support of such questioning, or that alcohol would play a 
sufficient role at trial as to warrant an otherwise irrelevant intrusion into a juror's privacy. 
Mr. Kearfs contention that he should have received a new trial because juror Gary 
Harward was biased is contrary to Utah law. The affidavits submitted by Mr. Kearl in 
connection with his motion were inadmissible in both their wording and content. 
Moreover, juror Harward did not, and could not, have answered dishonestly the two 
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questions that Mr. Kearl cited to the trial court, because they called for individual feelings 
and beliefs, and were asked before Mr. Harward had any information about the case or 
what evidence might be offered. Additionally, Mr. Harward |ias not shown that "correct" 
answers would have compelled the disqualification of Mr. H$rward for cause, or that the 
trial court abused its discretion in denying him a new trial. 
Mr. Kearl has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to 
grant him a new trial due to opposing counsel's perceived mishandling of a trial exhibit. 
Not only did the trial court find (and Mr. Kearl does no^ dispute) that the line of 
questioning and information contained within the exhibit w^s admissible, but the court 
may have concluded that the whole Exhibit 38 incident was ^ misunderstanding. In any 
event, it cannot be an abuse of discretion to sanction a party twice for the same 
misconduct, particularly when the court had instructed ^he jury to disregard the 
challenged content in the exhibit. 
With respect to defense counsel's use of an expert's prior independent medical 
examination reports to cross-examine him, the court propeijly found that such use is 
common and appropriate, and he had done the same thing himself as a trial attorney. The 
alleged violation of someone else's privacy does not provide a basis for Mr. Kearl to 
obtain a new trial in a negligence case. Further, his argument is inconsistent with the 
rules of civil procedure, and was immaterial because counsel ho identifying information 
about the other litigants was disclosed in counsel's questioning br the exhibit. 
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Mr. Kearl's argument that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting 
testimony by the defendant's expert is baseless. Mr. Kearl does not provide a transcript 
of whatever Dr. Smith's testimony was, which precludes a finding that such testimony 
was prejudicial. Mr. Kearl's motion to exclude the testimony would have required the 
trial court to make fact findings, and to resolve inter-experts disputes that were more 
properly for the jury. Mr. Kearl's additional argument that the jury should have been told 
that the defendant's expert was paid by a liability insurance company is frivolous, 
particularly where the jury had already been informed that he was hired by the 
defendant's attorney, and thus were on notice of potential favoritism. 
Mr. Kearl's contention that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that 
the consumption of alcohol can be a pre-existing condition is not only a novel approach to 
that concept, but is unsupported by any citation to trial testimony that would have 
supported such an instruction. 
Finally, Mr. Kearl has not shown that the trial court erred in not recusing himself. 
The issue was not properly raised in the trial court, and there was no reasonable basis for 
claiming bias or an appearance of bias in the brief exchange that occurred between 
defense counsel and Judge Stott while the parties were waiting for the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
For logical consistency, the errors claimed by Mr. Kearl are addressed below in the 
order in which they allegedly occurred. Before addressing Mr. Kearl's contentions, 
however, appellee notes a threshold consideration regarding the standard of review. 
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I. KEARL'S FAILURE TO IDENTIFY APPLICABLE STANDARDS 
OF REVIEW SHOULD PRECLUDE APPEtLATE REVIEW, 
Mr. Kearl identifies four issues on appeal, and argues others in the body of his brief. 
Contrary to the requirements of U.R.A.P. 24(A)(5), Mr. Kearl ijas made no effort to identify 
and argue the differing standards of review applicable to each issue. Instead, he summarily 
states that every issue is a question of law reviewed for correctness, even such classic 
abuse-of-discretion scenarios as admission of expert testimony, limitations on cross 
examination and voir dire, and sanctions for alleged attorney misconduct. For each issue he 
cites the same criminal case, which did not involve any of the issues raised in this appeal. 
See Brief of Appellant, pp. 6-7 (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 9fe, 935-936 (Utah 1994).) 
In arguing every issue de novo, Mr. Kearl is unfair not only to the trial court but to 
the appellee and the reviewing court, who must sift through the issues, determine the actual 
standard of review, and then apply that standard without assistance from Mr. Kearl. The 
standard of review is a critical issue, particularly in a post-tr|al appeal. This Court has 
warned parties in the past of the need to comply with Rule 24(A)(5): 
This standard of review requirement [of U.R.A.P. 24] was added to our rules 
effective April 1, 1990, and should not be ignored. The purpose of this requirement 
is to focus the briefs, thus promoting more accuracy and efficiency in the processing 
of appeals. Due to appellant's lack of compliance with J our rules on this issue, we 
assume the correctness of the trial court's judgment. 
Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69, 73 (Utah App. 1991); sefy also Spencer v. Pleasant 
View City, 2003 UT App 379, % 20, 80 P.3d 546 (a party wh^ ) fails to provide reasoned 
analysis of an issue waives appellate review of the issue). Appellee respectfully submits 
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that Mr. Kearl's failure to address the applicable standard of review should preclude review 
of all issues that are subject to an abuse-of-discretion standard. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DECLINING TO ASK PLAINTIFF'S VOIR DIRE QUESTIONS 
REGARDING ALCOHOL, 
As noted above, this issue has not been preserved. While Mr. Kearl did include 
three questions regarding alcohol in his proposed 65-question voir dire, he does not point to 
any place in the record where he argued his legal entitlement to the instructions. The court 
gave the parties an opportunity to argue voir dire (R. 554-555), and thus the issue was 
preserved only if Mr. Kearl can show in 1he record that he provided legal authority and 
analysis in support of his proposed questions. O'Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46, ffif 15, 18-19, -
- P.3d -— OTo properly preserve an issue at the district court, the following must take 
place: '(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically 
raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.'"). 
In any event, Mr. Kearl has failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial 
court. Assuming that the court did not ask the requested questions (no transcript of the voir 
dire has been provided, and there is no written version in the record), Mr. Kearl has not 
demonstrated that declining to do so was beyond the limits of reasonableness. Before trial, 
the court had curtailed some lines of questioning in which alcohol might have played a role. 
For example, the court had granted Mr. Kearl's motion in limine to limit his ex-wife's 
testimony regarding the reasons for their divorce (R. 271-272, 554, 791), which, according 
to her deposition, had included alcohol abuse. (R. 332.) 
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Although the parties mentioned in pretrial filings thai] Mr. Kearl "self-medicated" 
with alcohol, nothing advised the court that alcohol would be such a prominent issue as to 
require the potentially invasive voir dire, particularly where ^here was no claim that Mr. 
Kearl had been drinking at the time of the accident. (Nor, without a transcript, can the 
Court know to what extent, or in what context, alcohol even c^me up at trial. Before trial, 
references to alcohol were limited to damages.) Under the circumstances, the court could 
reasonably have concluded that the proposed questioning wasj not sufficiently pertinent to 
the issues of the case, or was not sufficiently probative of bias), or would unfairly stack the 
deck in favor of the plaintiff. Mr. Kearl has not shown an abus0 of discretion. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED 
UPON ALLEGED JUROR BIAS. 
A. The cited portions of juror Armstrong's affidavit were inadmissible. 
As a threshold matter, the Court should not reach the issue of alleged juror 
misconduct because the supporting affidavit of Juror no. 17, jfCay Armstrong, was based 
almost entirely upon her interpretations and assumptions and paraphrasing of undisclosed 
statements, and other inadmissible content. In particular: 
1f 3: "One of the problems I saw was prejudice on the part of more 
than one juror. " This is not a factual assertion; it is purely cojiclusory, lacks foundation, 
and purports to speculate on the mental state of (unnamed) thir^l parties. 
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f 4. "[Mr. Harward] came in the jury room with his mind made 
up." This assertion lacks foundation, is conclusory, and is improper speculation on 
someone else's alleged mental state. 
% 5. "[MJr. Harward could not get past the fact that Plaintiff drank 
alcohol and did not hold to Mr. Harward's religious standards, which he cited several 
times to me and once or twice to the jury, even though those facts had no relation to the 
injury and how it occurred. " This assertion is conclusory, lacks adequate foundation, and 
is improper speculation on someone else's mental state. Instead of providing an actual 
quotation and permitting the reader to draw inferences, she is simply offering her own 
perception of what was said, if anything. Even if Mr. Harward made some reference to 
alcohol, Ms. Armstrong does not identify the context in which he did so. 
f 7. "Mr. Harward kept saying that Mr. Kearl did not do what he 
was supposed to do, and he was in effect getting what he deserved." The words uin 
effect" rendered this assertion conclusory and lacking in foundation. Ms. Armstrong 
(apparently) assumes this is a reference to alcohol, but without a quotation or information 
regarding the context, it could just as easily be, e.g., a reference to Mr. Okelberry's 
claimed testimony that he told Mr. Kearl not to touch the trailor, and Mr. Kearl did so 
anyway. (R. 498.) 
T| 8. "In essence, Mr. Harward was judging Mr. Kearl by his own 
religious standards and not with the evidence presented at trial." This statement is 
conclusory, speculative, and lacking in foundation. 
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*| 9. "I don't think anything else made a difference to Mr. Harward. 
He did not at any time want to discuss with an open mind evidence presented in Court 
about how the injury happened. " This assertion is speculative and conclusory on its face, 
and improper comment on someone else's alleged mental siate and whether the person 
was acting with what the affiant considered a sufficiently uop0n mind." 
These assertions were nothing more than interpretation^; - from a dissenting juror's 
point of view - of a few unspecified comments over a fiVe-hour period. They were 
incomplete, and lacked an indicia of reliability. Appellee Ok0lberry respectfully submits 
that Ms. Armstrong's affidavit should not be considered by th^ Court. 
More fundamentally, affidavits that purport to disclose a juror's "opinions, 
surmises and processes of reasoning in arriving at a Verdict" are presumptively 
inadmissible. State v. Gee, 28 Utah 2d 96, 498 P.2d 662, 665-66 (1972); State v. Couch, 
635 P.2d 89, 96 (Utah 1981), citing People v. Flynn, 7 Utah ^78, 384, 26 P. 1114, 1116 
(1891). "[Sjuch post mortems would be productive of no ^nd of mischief and render 
service as a juror unbearable." Id., quoting Wheat v. Denver \& R.G.W.R. Co., 122 Utah 
418, 250 P.2d 932 (1952). 
To permit litigants to get jurors to sign affidavits or testify to matters discussed in 
connection with their functions as jurors would open the door to inquiry into all 
matters of things which a losing litigant might consider improper: misconceptions 
of evidence or law, offers of settlement, personal experiences, prejudice against 
litigants or their causes or the classes to which theyl belong. It would be an 
interminable and totally impracticable process. 
Rosenlofv. Sullivan, 616 P.2d 372, 375-376 (Utah 1983), quoting Wheat, 250 P.2d at 937. 
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In view of these considerations, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, and Utah Supreme Court precedent narrowly prescribe the grounds upon which 
juror affidavits may be submitted. Affidavits relating to jury deliberations are admissible 
only if they aver one of three things: 1) that the verdict was determined uby chance or as 
a result of bribery," U.R.Civ.P. 59(a)(2); 2) that extraneous prejudicial information was 
improperly brought to the jury's attention, or 3) that an outside influence was improperly 
brought to bear upon any juror. U.R.E. 606(b). 
In the court below, Mr. Kearl did not dispute these limitations, but argued that the 
affidavits were admissible because (1) Mr. Harward's alleged religious bias was 
"extraneous prejudicial information brought to bear" and/or uan outside influence," and 
(2) the affidavits showed that he had failed to disclose material information during voir 
dire (i.e., that he was allegedly biased). (R. 869-871.) Neither argument has merit. 
1. Under Utah law, a juror's religious belief or inspiration is not 
an improper outside influence. 
As noted above, Mr. Kearl's counsel submitted an affidavit in which Mr. Harward 
said after the trial, "I don't have anything to explain. And I think I had help making the 
decision." (R. 805-806 % 4.) Mr. Kearl assumes that Mr. Harward's reference to ''help" 
is a reference to spiritual help. Even assuming that to be true (although it seems just as 
likely that he was referring to the other five jurors who agreed with him), it is well settled 
in Utah that a juror's belief that his vote was divinely inspired does not constitute 
"improper influence" being brought to bear upon him. State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 84 
28 
(Utah 1988); see also State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 426-27 (Utah App. 1989) (juror 
affidavits regarding divine revelations do not fall within the exception set forth in Rule 
606(b); court properly refused to consider juror's affidavit).6 
2. Mr. Kearl did not meet his burden of showing that Mr. 
Harward provided false information. 
Mr. Kearl is correct that if a party has shown tljiat a juror provided false 
information in voir dire, affidavits may be introduced to sho^v whether that information 
was brought to bear in the deliberative process. State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 
1992). "All other proof as to what was said or done in the juify room, including evidence 
that the jury was confused or that it misunderstood or disregarded the facts or the 
applicable law, is inadmissible as violative of the long-standing policy against attempts to 
undermine the integrity of verdicts." Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah 1983) 
(testimony that verdict was based on incorrect assumptions 0f insurance coverage was 
"inadmissible and incompetent as a basis on which to grant a niotion for a new trial"). 
In this case, however, no reasonable argument can b4 made that juror Harward 
made misrepresentations or omissions in voir dire. Mr. Kearljs motion for new trial was 
limited to a claim that Mr. Harward answered falsely two questions on the Prospective 
6
 As the Supreme Court has observed, "construing 'outside influence' to include 
responses to prayer could well infringe upon the juror's religiobs liberties." Tolman, 775 
P.2d at 427, citing DeMille, 756 P.2d at 84. The Utah constitution, for example, prohibits 
disqualification of a juror for his religious beliefs. Article I, § 4. 
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Jury Questionnaire. (R. 818-819.) He did not claim any falsity or omission in Mr. 
Harward's answers to any of the questions put to him by the trial court. Id.7 
Whether a juror answered a question honestly is a question of fact determined by 
an objective standard. Thomas, 830 P.2d at 245-246. As a matter of law, however, a 
juror cannot be deemed to have failed to answer a question honestly %;if the juror was not 
asked a question regarding the subject matter alleged to have gone undisclosed." Id. 
Under Utah Supreme Court precedent, the information must have been specifically 
requested before a non-disclosure can be found. Id., citing Hard v. Burlington Northern 
R.R., 870 F.2d 1454, 1460 (9th Cir. 1989) (juror who was asked whether he was ever 
employed by defendant railroad not required to reveal he was former employee of 
predecessor railroad); United States v. Aguon, 851 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1988) (juror who 
was asked only general question regarding his ability to be impartial not required to reveal 
that he was under investigation for situation similar to that of the defendant); and United 
States v. O'Neill, 767 F.2d 780, 784-85 (11th Cir. 1985) (in trial for various drug 
On appeal, Mr. Kearl abandons this argument, and instead raises a new contention that 
Mr. Harward answered falsely in one-on-one questioning when he said he could be fair 
and impartial. See Brief of Appellant, pp. 20-21. However, the trial court's exercise of 
discretion must necessarily be judged based upon the arguments that were presented to it. 
In any event, this contention suffers from the same defect as his original argument, which 
is that there is no indication that Mr. Harward was not telling the truth about his intent to 
be fair and impartial. At this time, he still did not know anything about the case, or what 
evidence would be presented. 
30 
offenses, juror never asked if he had any friends in law enforcement not required to reveal 
that he had two friends who were narcotics agents) (parenthic^l summaries verbatim). 
In this case, Mr. Kearl did not identify a specific factual inquiry that Mr. Harward 
answered dishonestly, or that even could be answered dishonestly. The Questionnaire 
was completed by the jury pool before they knew anything about the case other than that 
it probably involved an accident of some sort. Mr. Harwar^ disclosed that he had been 
injured in an auto accident himself, and that he favored the filing of lawsuits if needed as 
a means of resolving disputes, both of which favored Mr. Keafl. (Questions 7 and 12; see 
R. 948, pp. 3-4.) 
Mr. Kearl argues that, without knowing what the lawsuit involved or that alcohol 
would even be mentioned, Mr. Harward should have been prescient enough to volunteer 
that, by the way, he (allegedly) disapproves of persons who djink. Under that reasoning, 
should he have also volunteered that he doesn't like dog people, or people who ride 
motorcycles, or everything else he could think of in case it cai^ ie up at trial? Mr. Kearl's 
criticism of Mr. Harward is baseless. 
In West v. Holley, 2004 UT 97, 103 P.3d 708, cited by ^lr. Kearl, a juror answered 
no to the specific, objectively verifiable question of whether she had ever been involved 
in a lawsuit. The juror later admitted that she had been the siibject of a contract lawsuit 
and workers' compensation claims that she considered spuriou$, and that she should have 
disclosed those experiences. Id.,%6. 
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In this case, by contrast, the only questions cited by Mr. Kearl were general 
inquiries about Mr. Harward's "belief or "feeling," purely subjective perceptions. 
Question No. 8 on the Prospective Jury Questionnaire asked: "Do you believe you have a 
valid reason that would make it difficult for you to serve as a juror? If necessary, the 
Judge can discuss this with you privately." Question No. 10 asked: "If you were in the 
position of either party, would you feel comfortable with yourself as a juror? If not, 
please explain." Mr. Harward answered, "Yes." (Emphasis added on both questions.) 
Even if the affidavit of Ms. Armstrong were considered, her allegation that Mr. 
Harward had formed a negative opinion of Mr. Kearl by the time the trial ended does not 
mean that his answers were false when he filled out the questionnaire, before he knew 
anything about Mr. Kearl or his claims. The jurors had sat through a week of trial. It 
would hardly be surprising if one or more of them had formed opinions as to liability by 
the time it was over—indeed, it would be surprising if they hadn't. Anyone who has ever 
had a jury come back in 45 minutes knows that many jurors form opinions by the time 
they are sent out to deliberate. 
A juror also cannot be deemed to have answered dishonestly unless a question is 
unambiguous. Thomas, 830 P.2d at 246. Question 8, asking if the juror believes he has a 
valid reason that would make it difficult to serve, is usually designed to elicit whether 
some logistical problem exists that would make service difficult, such as a medical 
condition, a non-refundable plane ticket, etc. The meaning that Mr. Kearl ascribed to this 
question was unusual, and certainly not the only reasonable construction. With respect to 
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Question No. 10, before hearing any evidence and without ^mowing what the case was 
about, Mr. Harward opined that he would feel comfortable v i^th himself as a juror. How 
can that be false? The question calls for an emotion, a purely Speculative prediction. 
Mr. Harward was not asked during voir dire his vi^ws on alcohol (which was 
within the trial court's discretion, see Point I, supra), or othe^ issues that might or might 
not implicate someone's religious beliefs. No argument can $e made that his answers to 
Questions 8 or 10 were dishonest. Absent that threshold showing, the affidavits regarding 
jury deliberations are inadmissible, and should not be considered on review. 
B. Mr. Kearl has not met his burden of shoeing an abuse of discretion 
for denial of a new trial on the grounds of juror misconduct in ^ny event. 
Utah has adopted the "McDonough" test for resolving allegations of misconduct 
based on a juror's alleged misstatements or omissions during voir dire. State v. Evans, 
2001 UT 22, \ 25, 20 P.3d 888, citing McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 
464 U.S. 548 (1984). Under McDonough, a party alleging su^h grounds must show that 
(1) a "juror failed to answer honestly a material question on vdir dire," and (2) "a correct 
response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for ^ause." Id. 
The first issue, whether a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on 
voir dire, has been addressed above. No such showing can be ikiade. Under McDonough, 
the inquiry goes no further. In any event, though, Mr. Keail has not established that 
either question was material, or that a "correct" answer would l^ ave compelled the striking 
of Mr. Harward for cause. 
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According to Ms. Armstrong's affidavit, other jurors - including herself- were 
fully able to express their views during deliberations. Five other jurors agreed with Mr. 
Harward that the defendant was not negligent. Mr. Kearl's alleged bias against the 
alcohol consumption involved a damages issue, which the jury did not reach. The trial 
court indicated that it was not persuaded that Mr. Harward's alleged behavior impacted 
Mr. Kearl's ability to have a fair trial. (R. 13-16.) Mr. Kearl has not demonstrated that 
the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial on this ground. 
IV. MR. KEARL HAS NOT SHOWN AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS REGARDING ALLEGED 
ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT REGARDING EXHIBIT 38. 
On appeal, Mr. Kearl raises three arguments as to why he was entitled to a new 
trial with respect to the infamous Exhibit 38. First, he claims that the exhibit was not 
timely disclosed. Second, he claims that the exhibit violated the privacy of third parties. 
Third, he claims that defense counsel "deceived" the trial court with respect to the content 
of the exhibit. None of these arguments has merit. 
As to timeliness of the disclosure, the trial court specifically noted that it had 
raised a concern with both parties about untimely disclosures. It was fully aware of the 
history of the proceedings, and was in a unique position to assess the reasonableness and 
fairness of allowing use of the exhibit. Signficantly, no claim is (or can be) made that the 
line of questioning itself had to be disclosed in advance, but only the summary of those 
questions on the exhibit. 
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Mr. Kearl's suggestion that his witness looked unprepared is not borne out by the 
record cites. Dr. France, a seasoned expert, did not fumble a{id appear unable to answer. 
Rather, the transcript reflects that he reviewed the material provided and answered that, as 
far as he could tell, it was correct. He then explained why t)tie recommendations for all 
three litigants were similar. Mr. Kearl had a chance to rehabilitate him. 
No prejudice can be shown in any event, because thb exhibit pertained only to 
damages, which the jury did not reach. See Clayton v. For4 Motor Co., 2009 UT App 
154, ffll 33-34, — P.3d — (any errors involving negligence | instructions were harmless 
where jury did not reach the issue of negligence). Mr. Kearl'^ claim that his counsel was 
made to look like a bumbler while defendant's counsel appeared to have 'Terry Mason 
like" command of the courtroom is wild speculation, especially when the jury was later 
told that Exhibit 38 had been eliminated. Mr. Kearl's counsel stated at the time that he 
did not think defense counsel had made a very good point with the exhibit. (R. 948, p. 
22.) If that is true, how was Mr. Kearl materially prejudiced b^ it? 
As the trial court pointed out, and as Mr. KearFs couns|el admitted, Exhibit 38 did 
nothing more than summarize other evidence that was properly admitted. See, e.g., 
Schmidt v. Intermountain Health Care, 635 P.2d 99, 102 (Ut^h 1981) (fact that medical 
record containing same information as objectionable testimony had been admitted 
supported trial court's discretion in denying motion for new trial). The court concluded 
that the information beneath the sheet was appropriate cross-examination material. (R. 
948, p. 23.) It is not an abuse of discretion to deny a new tjial for allegedly improper 
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handling of an otherwise proper exhibit. See, e.g., Estate of Russell v. Russell, 852 P.2d 
997, 998-999 (Utah 1993) (trial court has "considerable discretion" in determining the 
mode and manner of presentation of evidence). 
The trial court had already sanctioned defense counsel once for the perceived 
misconduct, withdrawing Exhibit 38 and instructing the jury that uyou are to disregard 
any of the information from [the exhibit] it except as to what Dr. France testified to 
concerning Mr. Kearl only." See State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 70 (Utah 1993) (no 
prejudicial error where court instructed jury to disregarded information); see also 
U.R.Civ.P. 37(f) (authorizing court to impose sanctions for failure to disclose as listed in 
U.R.Civ.P. 37(b), including barring use of material at trial). There is no basis in the Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and obvious due process concerns are raised, by a request to sanction 
defendant a second time for the same conduct. 
It also cannot be considered an abuse of discretion to deny a new trial when it had 
been shown to the trial court that the "deception" perceived by the court was partly an 
acoustical mishap. The court could reasonably have concluded that, notwithstanding its 
(understandable) ire at what it thought was a deceptive failure to disclose, counsel had not 
acted in bad faith such as to warrant additional sanctions, particularly the extreme 
sanction of a new trial (or, as Mr. Kearl's counsel also requested, a finding that Ms. 
Shapiro had "committed a crime"). 
Mr. Kearfs related claim that he should have received a new trial because the 
exhibit violated the privacy of third parties is without merit. Mr. Kearl does not explain 
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how he has standing to seek affirmative relief for the alleged violation of someone else's 
privacy right. (For example, HIPAA does not provide a priVate cause of action even to 
the subject of a record, Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 5^1-572 (5th Cir. 2006), and 
numerous cases cited. It would seem anomalous to let a Violation provide a basis for 
relief in someone else's negligence case.) 
None of Mr. Kearl's arguments regarding patient privacy, etc., have any relevance 
on appeal, because the trial court found that, not only would Ms. Shapiro be entitled to 
have the type of record at issue (prior reports of an expert), but that Exhibit 38 did not 
contain identifying information about the third parties. This is borne out by Mr. Kearl's 
I 
own averment that, had it not been for unredacted copies off underlying documentation 
provided by Okelberry's counsel, his counsel would not hav^ known whom to contact, 
even though he saw the exhibit and one of the subjects wad his own client. (Brief of 
Appellant, p. 30 n.5.)8 
8
 Mr. Kearl also complains about defense counsel's very act df giving unredacted copies 
of the underlying documentation to him and the court. No objection was made at the 
time, and it is difficult to see how one could object. Absent ait order otherwise, opposing 
counsel and the court are always entitled to see the full text of documents shown to a 
witness. 
Additionally, Mr. Kearl's suggestion that it is improper for counsel to obtain other 
reports by experts seems inconsistent with U.R.Civ.P. 26, whic^ h requires disclosure of all 
cases in which an expert has been retained for the past four years. One obvious purpose 
of this requirement is to allow a party to get copies of the expert's opinions in those other 
cases for cross-examination. That is particularly true since litigants for whom an expert 
performs an independent medical examination are not upatients" of the expert. Joseph v. 
McCann, 2006 UT App 459, \ 15, 147 P.3d 547. 
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For any and all of the above considerations, Mr. Kearl has not shown that it was an 
abuse of discretion to deny a new trial on grounds associated with Exhibit 38. 
V. MR. KEARL HAS NOT SHOWN AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS REGARDING EXPERT 
WITNESS CRAIG SMITH. 
A. Mr. Kearl cannot challenge the admission of testimony at trial when he has 
failed to provide a record of what that testimony was. 
Mr. Kearl argues that the trial court erred "by allowing Dr. Craig Smith to testify, 
and by not allowing Plaintiff to tell the jury that Colorado Casualty Insurance hired defense 
expert Dr. Craig Smith[.]" (Brief of Appellant, p. 7.) Mr. Kearl has not provided a 
transcript of Dr. Smith's testimony, however, precluding any claim of prejudicial error. See 
Kelson v. Salt Lake County, 784 P.2d 1152, 1157 (Utah 1989) (rejecting claim of error in 
admitting testimony; "In taking his appeal, Kelson failed to designate the trial transcript as 
part of the appellate record. In the absence of a transcript, it is impossible for us to ascertain 
whether, assuming an error was committed, a 'substantial right' has been affected").9 
B. No abuse of discretion can be shown. 
In any event, Mr. Kearl has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in 
allowing Dr. Smith to testify. The basic premise of Mr. Kearl's motion in limine, and his 
9
 If Mr. Kearl assumes that Dr. Smith testified as to everything in his report or deposition, 
that is obviously unrealistic. Reports and depositions set the boundaries of testimony; 
they do not define it. The trial court had ruled that experts could testify "subject to the 
rule compliance . . . in accordance with those guidelines." (R. 554.) That suggests that 
the trial court planned to determine the scope of questioning at the time of trial. 
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argument on appeal, is that the jack had been heavily used and was beaten up by the time 
Dr. Smith examined it, whereas it was new at the time of the accident. 
There were several grounds upon which the trial c^urt could reasonably have 
rejected Mr. KearFs contention. First, the court may have considered the fact that the jack 
was several years old at the time of inspection because Mr. K^arl waited almost four years 
after the accident to file suit (R. 2-3). The court could reasonably have considered it unfair 
for Mr. Kearl to create a circumstance through delay, then try to take advantage of that 
circumstance by preventing the defendant from offering expert testimony. 
Mr. Kearl's argument also suffered from the inconvenient fact that his own expert 
inspected the same beaten up jack in preparing his own report just three months earlier. 
Although Mr. Kearl sought to excuse his expert's reliance on the used jack by claiming that 
he had focused more on design, Mr. Okelberry pointed out to ^he court that Dr. Smith also 
addressed design. (R. 486-487.) The trial court could reasonably have concluded that it 
was better to allow both experts than to strike both experts, particularly when each expert 
was fully prepared to point out the flaw in his counterpart's report. 
Mr. Kearl's motion would also have required the trial cc^ urt to resolve factual issues. 
For example, the court would have had to accept defendant Okdlberry's testimony about the 
condition of the jack at the time of the accident, while Mr. fiearl was insisting that Mr. 
Okelberry's testimony as to other facts should be rejected (e.g., Mr. Kearl's location at the 
time of the accident, how the accident occurred). Mr. KearPs motion would also have 
required the trial court to ignore the fact that Mr. Kearl's expert had not even mentioned 
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damage in his initial report, suggesting that the jack was not as damaged as Mr. Kearl later 
argued, or that the damage was immaterial to an expert's ability to form opinions in the 
case. It is not an abuse of discretion to let such disputes be heard by the jury. 
The same is true as to any testimony that Dr. Smith may have given that Mr. Kearl 
felt strayed beyond his expertise. While Mr. Kearl incorrectly states Dr. Smith's 
background in the field (he had taken three courses in addition to his research), it is within a 
trial court's discretion to allow such challenges to be presented through cross-examination, 
rather than barring a line of questioning before the court has even heard the questions. 
On appeal, Mr. Kearl largely rehashes his pretrial arguments as to why his expert's 
conclusions were more sound than those of Mr. Okelberry's expert. While such contentions 
provide excellent cross-examination fodder, it was not an abuse of discretion to allow the 
jury to hear competing views. Mr. Kearl suggests, however, that the trial court has no 
discretion to allow testimony unless the party can prove that the product was in the same 
condition as the time of the accident. Notably, however, cites no Utah authority to that 
effect, and most of Mr. Kearl's cases involve the specialized area of product liability, in 
which the existence of a defect at the time of sale is a required element. Moreover, in those 
cases, the appellate court held only that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
deciding whether the testimony came in. It still comes down to discretion, and Mr. Kearl 
has not shown any abuse here. 
Mr. Kearl's second argument regarding Dr. Smith is baseless on its face. In a rather 
patent attempt to inject liability insurance into the trial, Mr. Kearl argued that he should be 
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allowed to tell the jury that the defendant's expert witness was "hired" by his liability 
insurance company.10 
Mr. Kearl's argument makes little sense, and does nothing to prove an abuse of the 
trial court's discretion in concluding that such testimony, even if probative, would be 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. If Mr. Kearl is suggestingi that a jury would not realize 
a potential for bias by a party's expert unless they are told tha^ : a liability insurer is paying 
him, that is perplexing. The jury was told that the expert had been hired by Mr. Okelberry 's 
attorney. (R. 948, p. 36.) Jurors are not stupid; they wou^d obviously know that the 
defendant's attorney would not have hired the expert unless khe thought his conclusions 
would help the defendant's case. Mr. Kearl's own cases indicate the lack of prejudicial 
effect when the jury already knows of a relationship with counsel. See, e.g., Herbold v. 
Ford Motor Co., 310 Ky. 697, 221 S.W.2d 646 (1949) (error \n precluding testimony that 
witness was employed by insurance company was harmless, wh^re witness disclosed that he 
worked in the office of defense counsel). 
10 Mr. Kearl offered no factual support for that contention, wi 
counsel should know, having come from a former insurance 
which Ms. Shapiro is now employed), an insurance company may pay for an expert, but it 
is the attorney who makes decisions regarding her client's case 
hich is inaccurate. As his 
defense firm (the firm at 
and hires the expert. 
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VL MR. KEARL HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REJECTING HIS JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING ALCOHOL USE AS A PRE-
EXISTING CONDITION. 
As noted above, the plaintiff proposed a jury instruction (R. 584) in which the trial 
court would had instructed the jury that use of alcohol could be a pre-existing condition. 
The record does not show a citation to any legal authority by Mr. Kearl for this proposed 
instruction, which waives review. Id. 
The Court need not address Mr. Kearl's argument regarding this instruction in any 
event because it was proposed in connection with, and pertained solely to, damages. {See 
R. 583-591; #11 "Introduction to tort damages"; #12 "Proof of damages"; #13 "Economic 
damages defined"; #14 "Non-economic damages defined"; etc.) The jury did not reach 
damages. 
Additionally, Mr. Kearl has not attempted to meet his burden of showing that 
competent evidence was adduced at trial that would support such an instruction. See p. 5, 
supra (party is entitled to instruction only if competence evidence at trial supports it). His 
failure to provide a trial transcript is fatal to this claim.11 
In the absence of a transcript, the trial court's rationale for denying the instructions is 
unavailable to this Court. However, for what it is worth, the court's copy of Plaintiffs 
Proposed Jury Instructions happens to contain handwriting that appears to be that of the 
judge or his clerk. With respect to the alcohol-as-pre-existing condition and related 
instructions, the handwriting says, "What were pre-exh-cond, if any?" (Instruction 18, R. 
584) and "Not given - no evidence of this." (Instruction No. 19, R. 583.) Although this 
handwriting cannot substitute for a transcript of the jury instruction conference, it may 
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Finally, Mr. Kearl's proposed instructions would have constituted improper 
comment on the evidence (assuming that any evidence was Adduced). A jury instruction 
explains the law; it was up to Mr. Kearl's counsel to explain Application of that law to his 
client's theory of the case. It would have been improper for the trial court to endorse 
counsel's rather novel view of "pre-existing condition" by giving the instruction as written. 
VII. THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO RECUSE HIMSELF SUA SPC^NTE. 
As noted above, three months after the alleged improper conduct, and two days 
after Judge Stott announced an intent to deny Mr. Kearl's motion for new trial, Mr. Kearl 
filed a motion to disqualify the judge. Mr. Kearl takes offense at appellee's suggestion 
that this timing is not coincidental, but actions speak louder th^n words. It is hard to draw 
any other inference from this temporal proximity, particularly when Mr. Kearl specifically 
requested that his motion for new trial be reargued before a different judge. (R. 895.) 
The standard of review for this issue is not entirely cle^r. First, it is not clear that 
there was a ruling, or that there was required to be. Although ^Ir. Kearl made a motion to 
disqualify, he withdrew that motion before any action by the bourt was due. It was only 
in the body of his Withdrawal that he suggested that the judgd recuse himself. That does 
not seem to be a proper method of bringing an issue to a trial court's attention. Under this 
analysis, there was no preservation, nothing to rule on, and no issue for review. 
reinforce the conclusion that the instructions were disallowed because Mr. Kearl failed to 
adduce evidence to support them. 
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If one assumes that the trial court was obligated to, and/or did, rule on the 
suggestion of disqualification, the standard of review is still unclear. There is, again, 
nothing to review if the disqualification was not pursued timely. Madsen v. Prudential 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass% 767 P.2d 538, 543 (Utah 1988); see also U.R.Civ.P. 63 (setting 
forth procedure for motions to disqualify). 
In the court below, Mr. Kearl admitted that his motion was untimely. (R. 928) 
("Plaintiff hereby withdraws his motion to enter disqualification because it was not filed 
timely.")-) Moreover, it is well established in Utah that a party who continues to 
participate in proceedings, and/or seeks affinnative relief from a court, after learning of 
alleged grounds for disqualification waives any right to challenge the judge's continued 
participation. Lunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App 192, f^l[ 12, 15, 186 P.3d 978 (parties waived 
disqualification under Canon3(E)(1)(a) when they did not object to judge's continued 
involvement after learning of potential grounds for disqualification), and cases cited. 
In the month after the exchange at issue occurred, Mr. Kearl sought a new trial 
from Judge Stott based in large part on the Exhibit 38 incident, seeking to capitalize upon 
Judge Stott's dismay with defense counsel regarding that incident by quoting the judge's 
chastisement of counsel back to him. (R. 861.) A party cannot make a strategic decision 
to forego a motion to disqualify, and then belatedly file one if his strategy fails. As the 
Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
A party who has a reasonable basis for moving to disqualify a judge may not delay 
in the hope of first obtaining a favorable ruling and then complain only if the 
result is unfavorable. Not only is such a tactic unfair, but it may evidence a belief 
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that the judge is not in fact biased. Furthermore, delay imposes unnecessary 
disruption on both the judicial system and litigants. A disqualification proceeding 
is a collateral attack on the substantive action, it disrupts orderly litigation, and it 
necessarily results in significant additional costs to the parties. Accordingly, a 
party must move with dispatch once a basis for disqualification is discovered. 
Mads en at 542 (emphasis added). See also 13 A Federal Practice and Procedure § 3551 
(footnote omitted) ("[t]he affidavit will be considered untimely [under federal rules] if the 
affiant, after knowledge of the facts showing the supposed bias, has sought the court's 
affirmative action in his behalf before filing the affidavit"); Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 
1230, 1233-34 (10th Cir. 1986) (affirming trial court's denial of a motion to recuse based 
in part on plaintiff filing a motion for partial summary judgmeht after he knew of the facts 
upon which he based his motion to recuse, but before he actually filed it). 
Even if the issue of disqualification had been properly and timely raised with the 
trial court, Mr. KearPs motion lacked merit. With respect to this issue, the Court has 
stated that, "determining whether a trial judge committed error by failing to recuse 
himself is a question of law, and we review such questions for correctness." State v. 
Tueller, 2001 UT App 317, 37 P.3d 1180. However, in that same case, the Court 
recognized that the trial court has greater knowledge regarding facts relating to the 
conduct of trial. Id.,% 12 (rejecting claim of bias; deferring {o trial court's advantage in 
assessing impact of courtroom activity). 
In the context presented by this case, the appropriate standard would appear to be 
abuse of discretion. See, e.g., D. Goldberg, et al., "The Best Defense: Why Elected 
Courts Should Lead Recusal Reform," 46 WASHBURN L.J. 503, 518 (''Nearly every 
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appellate court, state and federal, will overturn a lower court's disqualification or recusal 
decision only for an 'abuse of discretion.'"). For example, one of Mr. Kearl's arguments 
on appeal is that a reasonable appearance of bias could have arisen because Judge Stott 
had shown bias against him throughout the trial. Particularly without a transcript, how 
could this Court address that contention de novol 
The trial judge knows the history of a case, of the parties' prior dealings with each 
other and with the court, on and off the record, and observes the demeanor of everyone in 
the courtroom, including himself. If there has been no claimed impropriety in two years 
of litigation and five days of trial, it should be within a court's discretion to assess 
whether a three-minute conversation while the jury was out could override all of that 
history and create a "reasonable" appearance of bias. 
In any event, Mr. Kearl's motion for disqualification was legally insufficient. 
Rather misleadingly, Mr. Kearl (repeatedly) states that Judge Stott "held an ex parte 
meeting" with defendant's counsel "to compliment Defense Counsel on her work in the 
case, to state that he thought she had a strong finish, and to wish her good luck." Mr. 
Kearl derides the court as engaging in a "buddy-buddy" moment in which he "sang the 
praises" of defense counsel. 
If one is going to accuse a judge of misconduct, he should at least be fair enough 
to articulate the claimed misconduct objectively, and then argue it. Judge Stott did not 
"hold a meeting" with counsel for the purpose claimed by Mr. Kearl. The affidavits of 
Ms. Shapiro and Mr. Wenzel confirm that several hours into jury deliberation, a minor 
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exchange occurred in the courtroom that was impromptu, innocuous, and could not create 
a reasonable perception of bias. 
Waiting for a jury can be boring for tired parties an4 their counsel. Judge Stott 
attempted to make the wait a little less excruciating with a brief show of politeness, 
chatting informally with both lawyers, telling stories about h s^ days in practice, etc. (R. 
923.) Mr. Wenzel himself noted that, before the judge caibe out of chambers on the 
occasion in question, he had himself been chatting with defendant's counsel about sports. 
As Mr. Wenzel's affidavit suggests, his presence in the courtroom when Judge 
Stott came out was not a surprise to Ms. Shapiro, since he had just finished chatting with 
her when he went to lie down on a bench to text message a friend. At most, Mr. Wenzel 
says that Judge Stott "complimented defense counsel on her w o^rk and said that he thought 
she had a strong finish," and concluded the exchange with, "G^od luck."12 
Based upon that interaction, Mr. Kearl launched a bizarre personal attack on the 
trial court, stating, "Plaintiff does not know if the Court v a^s attracted to defendant's 
counsel, to defendant himself, or to defendant's cause." (R. 896.) Whether judged by 
abuse of discretion or de novo, it could not have been error to disregard such a ridiculous 
i 'j 
Mr. Wenzel says that "I don't think the Judge saw me because at the time he came to 
defense counsel I was laying in a bench in the audience section of the courtroom," which 
seems inconsistent with Mr. Wenzel's indication that he saw the judge walk over to the 
table. 
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accusation, which was not supported by the affidavit of Mr. Kearl's own witness. Indeed, 
Judge Stott later complimented both counsel on their advocacy. (R. 922). 
Concluding a brief conversation with "good luck" is nothing more than a social 
platitude. Anyone who has ever heard a half-time interview during a televised sporting 
event knows that they all end with a casual "good luck," regardless of who is being 
interviewed. No one would suggest that the reporter is evidencing bias toward a 
particular player or team. The same thing occurs regularly in every day conversation. 
Mr. Kearl does not claim, or attempt to show "how, absent the judge's comments, 
the result would have been different." Tueller, 2001 UT App 317, f 14. As the Utah 
Supreme Court has observed: 
The traditional judicial view is that if a judge can be disqualified for bias following 
a comment or ruling during the court proceedings, there is no limit to 
disqualification motions and there would be a return to 'judge shopping.' Any 
judicial comment or ruling gives the appearance of partiality in the broadest sense 
to the adversely affected party. . . . As long as the judge decides the case only after 
all the evidence is submitted, there appears to be no harm in such a comment. Such 
judicial comments made before a jury would constitute an improper expression of 
opinion on the evidence, but those statements made out of their hearing do not 
require recusal. As long as a judge does not allow the "propensities" to obscure 
the evidence and will decide the case only after all the evidence is heard, then 
disqualification is generally not warranted by a judge's comments. 
Madsen at 546, citing L. Abramson, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION UNDER CANON 3C OF 
THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 11-12,23 (1986). 
Although no bias could reasonably be claimed from the brief interaction, any such 
bias would not have compelled disqualification in any event. The Supreme Court has 
held that, in order for bias to rise to the level of disqualification, it must be personal, not 
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judicial. "In other words, the bias or prejudice must usually stem from an extrajudicial 
source, not from occurrences in the proceedings before the ju^ge." In re Young, 1999 UT 
81,U35,984P.2d997. 
The weakness of Mr. KearFs argument for disqualification is perhaps best 
illustrated by the Young case, upon which Mr. Kearl heavily relies. In that case, Judge 
Young called one party to a lawsuit and, inter alia, stated his view of another party's 
pending motion for attorney fees. The Utah Supreme Court held that this ex parte 
communication was inappropriate and sanctionable - but that it did not require 
disqualification. See id at ffl| 34-36. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, appellee Okelberry respectfully requests the Court 
affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this | u \jay of August, 2009. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Karra J. Porter 
Ruth A. Shapiro 
Attorneys for Appellee 
49 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the 10th day of August, 2009, two true and correct copy of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE were mailed, first-class postage prepaid, to: 
Denton M. Hatch 
128 West 900 North, Suite C 
Spanish Fork UT 84660 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
MIMA v£/A 
Karra J. Porter {JU 
Ruth A. Shapiro 
Attorneys for Appellee 
50 
